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In this paper I examine the ways in which globalisation is taking shape in the material world of economy, together with the changing rhetoric and repertoires of social and cultural worlds, and where and how are men and women situated within these changing and yet familiar worlds. I argue that in the fragmentation of the national state order lie many pitfalls for women and men, as do many new possibilities. Whether these possibilities open up new opportunities or close off already existing options will be dependent on many factors such as the current social positioning of women and men, the trajectory of the struggles within/between national sovereign states, the homogenising forces of marketisation, and the success, or otherwise, of increasingly global social movements.
Globalisation and Convergence of Policies

The International Context of Globality
The post-Cold War world is a place where the old alliances based on a clash of ideological and political visions have been replaced by a monopoly of discursive power with the liberal west.
The dominance of the liberal discourse is most evident in the works that celebrate modernity and look forward to the post-modern world as essentially liberal. The three dominant visions of the world which have been extremely influential are those of Fukayama's 'end of history' thesis(1991), Huntington's vision of the victory of Christian liberal ethic over the Islamic in a clash of civilisations (1995) , and Barber's lament against global capitalism and Islamic (and other) fundamentalisms that undermine democracy, and an evocation of a revitalised liberal democracy within the national state structure (1996) . In all these three sketches of the world in the next century, liberal values triumph over others; aspects of western civilisation over other cultures; modernity's concerns are resolved through these triumphs. Struggles within the parameters of other cultures, religions, and ideologies, upon this envisioning, are doomed to failure unless they recognise the impossibility of reform from within. The logical conclusion then is that western liberal world is the only future that we can 'rationally' look forward to if we wish to live civilised, non-violent and democratic lives.
For development studies this envisioning of liberal futures world wide has obvious importance.
In this context we see a new conditionality emerging in the development context -that based on the liberal conceptualisation of ethics and human rights, with the individual at its heart. The enthronement of possessive individualism then allows a consumerist ethic finding voice in the foreign policies of the western countries (DFID,1998) . Agency devolves to the western consumer who becomes an actor in the global civil society and a participant in reconfiguring recalcitrant, unaccountable national-states. On the other hand, the post-Cold War/Soviet Union international context allows the international economic institutions to deploy conditionality in the name of governance (see for example, World Bank, 1994) in order to pursue the policies of liberalism through national bureaucracies, who are projected as unaccountable if they refuse. In this conception of governance, non-governmental organisations, especially the international NGOs play an important role in a space that is supposedly being vacated by the nation-state.
Internationalisation or Globalisation?
There is a vast literature on globalisation that has been spawned in the last decade(). Higgott and Reich, for example, define this concept in two ways: "(i) as the emergence of a set of sequences and processes that are unhindered by territorial and jurisdictional barriers and that indeed enhance the spread of trans-border practices in economic, political, cultural and social domains, (ii) as a discourse of political knowledge offering one view of how to make the post-modern world manageable. " (1997:5) One of the questions asked repeatedly is whether there is anything new about globalisation, or rather, why has globalisation become a conceptual category of such significance at the end of the twentieth century. One argument for globalisation being a distinctive historical stage rests on the challenge it poses to modernity. While the nation-state was firmly tied to modernity, the argument goes, the promise of a global age is based upon the future of post-modernity: "Fundamentally the Global Age involves the supplanting of modernity with globality and this means an overall change in the basis of action and social organization for individuals and social groups." (Albrow, 1996:4) There are, Albrow signals, at least five major ways in which globality has taken us beyond the assumptions of modernity. They include the global environment and consequences of aggregate human activities; the loss of security where weaponry has global destructiveness; the globality of communication systems; the rise of a global economy; and the reflexivity of globalism, where people and groups of all kinds refer to the globe as the frame for their beliefs. " (ibid.) Albrow concludes that taken "together these represent the greatest challenge yet to the idea of even expanding modernity, and hence to the nation-state." (ibid.) However there are those that point out that globalisation as a process that gave 'a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country', so that 'in place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations', was described by Marx and Engels a hundred and fifty years ago in the Communist Manifesto. The internationalisation of capitalism was explanatory of colonialism (Lenin) as well as of international socialism. Within the development literature itself, the 'trickle down' and 'comparative advantage' conceptualisations of international economic relations were presuming globality, as were the dependency theorists as critics (see Chapter 2; Del Rosso Jr., 1995:175-207) . International trade and competition too was clearly highly developed by the 19th century, as were the international financial flows (Dunning, 1993, also see Hirst and Thompson, 1996) . One could, of course, argue that technological possibilities of bridging space and time (perhaps in Marxist speak, the means of production), and the availability of these technologies have qualitatively transformed our understanding of our place in the world. But an examination of the social and national profile of those who can access these new technologies, as opposed to be accessed by them might tell us a very different picture and a particular basis to globalisation. (some figures) However, what does seem beyond dispute is that at the heart of globalisation lies the "Market, or at least ideologies of free trade and open markets... [and] the increased potential for such flows [of international market transactions], resulting from the reduction of elimination of national and local barriers to all kinds of trade and investment." (Picciotto, 1996: 3)
Embedded Global Markets
If markets are at the centre of the understanding of globality -through the mechanisms of global production and exchange, of regulation that spans not one country but regions and (with the increased role of international economic institutions, and the WTO) the globe, through the use of technologies that so enhance the flows of monies and make instantaneous financial transactions across the globe possible, through breaking down the political resistance of nation-states to liberalisation and opening up of their internal markets to global competition -then we need to analyse the impact of gendered roles for women within markets. This analysis has to take place, we would argue, in the context of a theoretical understanding of markets as embedded in wider social and cultural frameworks (Polanyi,1944) rather than as rational, and impartial mechanisms for resource allocation as characterised by neo-liberal economics. It also needs to signal the changing form of the labour markets world wide.
Perhaps one of the novelties of the globalised markets of the late twentieth centuries is the very much increased possibilities of finance to flow across the world, while the earlier flow of human labour across national frontiers is being systematically slowed down 1 . In this context gender relations are being affected within the local spaces, and gender is affecting the mobility of labour at the global level (see chapter on migration? fair trade?). The new development discourse with the individual market agent central to it, also requires us to take seriously the ways in which men and women are able to access, and play the market in order to enhance their life-chances, or standards of living.
In discussing four dimensions of market power, White comments: "substance of market politics is characteristically about a number of issues: about the position of an agent or agents in relations to others within a market and their differential ability to extract resources through exchanges with other market participants; about the rules of the game and the nature of market institutions; and about the boundaries of the market." (1993:5) The participants in the market include the state, market organisations such as formal associations such as trade unions, consumer groups, business associations, market networks, firms and individuals. The functioning of the market depends upon the politics of state involvement, the politics of 1 We thank Prof. Sol Picciotto for formulating this proposition so succinctly.
market structures and the politics of social embeddedness -of the state and the market (White, 1993: 6-10 ). In such a patterned market system, participants come to specific markets with unequal capabilities and bargaining capacities and resources, which results in widely different market structures, regulated by different state formations, and characterised by more or less unequal power -class and gender are two bases for unequal power relations operating in the market. Bhaduri comments that the market mechanism is "better understood not in terms of its allocative efficiency, but as the mechanism for extraction of surplus by one class from another" which he terms as the 'class efficiency' of markets (in White,:8). Evans argues that "the power to threaten or disrupt economic relationships beyond the parameters of principal-agent relations is the kind of extra-economic coercion or influence that the neo-classical model fails to make explicit." (Evans, 1993:25) It thus fails to take into account the embedded nature of the markets. It does not query that individuals can pursue their economic self-interests in ways that has nothing to do with the 'best price'. Neither do they question the "degree to which self-interest places economic goals ahead of friendship, family ties, spiritual considerations, or morality." (Block, 1990:54) Finally, there is an assumption that instrumentality in decision making goes hand in hand with obedience to rules, and with maximising interests, rather than a set of signals that can lead to conflictual economic and social behaviour in different groups of populations. The social embeddedness of markets is therefore not considered, other than as a distortion, by neo-classical economists.
For men and women, the socially embedded market operates differently. For example, the caste regime in India means the exclusion of women (and other deprived groups) from certain areas of work (Bardhan, 1983) ; the colonial state in Africa 'rationalised' the production and sale of alcohol by erasing women from the market (Parpart and Staudt, 1989) . Much work has also been done on the ways in which employers -state and non-state -use culturally based norms to justify the restriction of women's employment to certain (low-paid) sectors (Mies; Ong, 1987; Truong, 1990; Hart,1991 Rai, 1991 chapter 6; 1992.; Einhorn, 1992; and Gilmartin, et.al., 1994) .
In an interesting critique of research on informal markets MacEwan Scott concludes that the gender segregation in the informal labour markets could be traced to the functioning of the family: "the family, not as an institution that differentiated the supply of male and female labour to the market, but as one that affected the entire organisation of small-scale production;
which handled resource allocation in a much wider sense and designated certain activities [skilled, in the public sphere] appropriate for men and other activities as appropriate for women. " (1995: 125) . Markets pose another issue for men and women. Globally, women own about one per cent of world's property; therefore they are involved in the globalisation process through their access to labour markets than through their participation in financial or production markets. They are provider of services -sexual, domestic and increasingly as workers in export production -and are employed in lower paid work; they are not in control of the huge financial and export flows in a globalised economy. Their specific positioning in the market, and the feminist and socialist critiques of markets pose questions about the nature and functioning of markets, the values and behaviours that they generate and the controls and mechanisms of accountability that are requeired in order that, in Polanyi's terms, the 'disruptive strains' and 'varied symptoms of disequilibrium ' (unemployment, class inequalities) and 'pressures on exchanges' and 'imperialist rivalries' do not go unchallenged.
Converging Masculinities in a Global World?
Behavioural aspects of the market are particularly important to the language of neo-liberal discourses on globalisation in normalising gendered patterns in the market place. 
The Disempowered State in the Global Age
With the focus on globalisation of the world economy, the national state too has come under scruitiny. There is a growing literature which assumes that globalisation and the marginalisation of the national state go hand in hand. The argument has been most cogently put by Susan Strange(1995: 55-74) . She makes three points to put her case: first that the nature of competion between states in the international system has changed -from competing over territory to competing over markets. Second, that as the form of competition between states has changed, so have their nature, with trade and finance policies becoming more important than defence and foreign policies. Finally, Strange argues that "authority over society and economy is undergoing another period of diffusion, after two or three centuries in which it became increasingly centralized in the in the institution of the state." (p.55). Strange's analysis has been challenged. As Cable argues, "The nation-state has 'lost' sovereignity to regional and global institutions and to markets but has also acquired new areas of control in order to promote 'national competitiveness '. (1995:23-24) One of the most innovative analysis of the national state in the era of globalisation is that of of its own relations with the global political economy, then it continues to be a focus for the struggles against this changing relations -whether it is from (dis-)organised labour in the urban or the rural context, whether it is from other social movements.
This more layered reading of the role that the state plays in national development allows for further explorations of the state as embedded in different cultural contexts. If we take the state to be an economic participant through its direct and indirect interventions in the sphere of economy, then Polanyi's concept of embeddedness becomes useful to analyse not only the market but also the state. In this context of embeddedness an examination of how different state fractions relate differently to each other, and to other civil and economic groups in different cultural milieus becomes important. We would argue that 'embeddedness' of state institututions in the power relations imbuing society, while supporting the goal of economic development, can and does also act against the interests of the politically marginalised groups. (Rai, 1996:14) This is because the relationship between a modernising state and a civil society within which it is configured, is a complex one. While for some groups the mutual reinforcing of bureaucratic capacity and social connectedness becomes the key to the effectiveness of the developmental state's effectiveness (Charlton and Donald, 1992 , p.7), for others, including women, the reinforcing of bureaucratic capacity by social norms can be a terrifying combination. In this context to view the state as a unitary entity becomes paralysing, and regarding civil society as 'a space of uncoerced human association' perilous (Rai, 1996, p. 17-18) .
Embeddedness also raises another issue for the analysis of the nation state in the context of globalisation. If the human economy is embedded in the non-economic (social) institutions as well as the economic, then an understanding of the complexities of these institutions is needed to assess their limits and potential. The nation-state as the focus of developmental struggles allows historical knowledges of traditions, cultures, and political contexts to be mobilised with greater fecility than the amorphous 'international economic institutions' peopled by shadowy
figures not visible to the local oppositional struggles. The frustrations of local struggles when they are unable to hold the international elites accountable for the disasters brought upon them, also fuels the lament for the nation-state.
The debate about the nature of the nation-state in the context of globalisation has not only focused attention on the protean nature of power relations, but has provoked another, more sentimental, intellectual response. There is a growing literature on the nation-state in the 'nostalgic mode' which obscures as much as it reveals in its analysis of the national/global dichotomy of power relations. For women this debate is relevant because it uses some of the iconography of nationalisms and also poses difficult questions about feasible politics.
Nostalgic Critics of Globalisation
As the nation-state is being represented as an endangered species, we also see a growing nostalgia for it. In the post-war period the nation-state became both the embodiment of national aspirations for development and the site of social engagement. While the state was configured differently in various countries of the Third World, the role of the state in development was seen to be central in all contexts. The failure of the state to deliver on its promises might lead to political instability, international interventions, or social unrest, but the focus of all was the nation-state. The Cold War politics provided a curious stability which meant that the role of non-governmental organisations was minimal and regulated and generally confined to immediate relief needs in times of crises. The multi-national corporations operated with impunity in some Third World states, but in others with much more caution, and within much less space. The 'spheres of influence' of the superpowers dictated some curtailment of state power, but also limited the challenges to it within its boundaries. It is with this context in mind that we must read the nostalgia that is building up for the nation-state as the rhetoric of globalisation gathers momentum.
In a recent article Kothari points out with concern that there is "evidence of growing marginalisation of the state in the face of a variety of globalising intrusions-in fact a growing disempowerment of the state and of the national elite both in its power to enforce national priorities ..." He arraigns the protagonists of globalisation for "converging on the need to reduce the role of the state in the affairs of the country and hand over things to market mechanisms and to increase integration into the 'world market'" For them, he laments, "pressures and demands from within, emanating from one's own people, are more dangerous than the pressures and demands coming from foreign corporations..." For a long time, he reminds us, "the nation-building exercise was conceived to be one that simultaneously led to greater unity of the nation and greater involvement and participation for the citizen in the institutions of the state." But now "the retreat of the state and the erosion of the nation are going hand in hand, one being hijacked by the global 'order' and 'market' and the other facing serious challenges from within.." He warns that as the nation-state becomes more and more unable to cope, the national elite "turn away from the basic political challenge of nationbuilding and the related economic challenge of 'development'". He prophesises "[a]s this happens, the autonomy of civil society too will decline and with it may also go down the modern search for a democratic order." (1995, pp.1593-1603) However, such a reading is only a partial explanation of the changing face of the national state.
The nostalgic recollection of the glory days of the nation-state is also disingenuous. The disempowered state is presented as a hapless victim of global market forces, as if it is not implicated in any way -through mismanagement, greed, incompetence, and policy changes -in the 'opening up' of its markets to the global forces. Further, the defenders of the nation-state paint a picture of the nation-state and its elites as largely benign, struggling under historical burdens of racial, communal, and religious hatred, trying to bring order to disordered societies, enlightenment to bear upon traditional prejudices that had not until then allowed a sense of national purpose: "The relationship of the new nation to pre-existing identities was in part to be one of transcendence, though it was far more to be one of encompassing them them and in some ways even 'representing' them all in a composite manner" (Kothari, 1995 (Kothari, , p. 1594 . The costs of building of composite national entities and identities were, however, borne in large part by the marginalised, subaltern, non-hegemonic groups of which women were a significant part. Also, this benign picture of the transformative nationalist elites is based upon a very narrow base. There are a few countries like India, Tanzania, and Egypt that experienced sustained periods of political stability and where the nationalist state enjoyed any significant legitimacy. In these countries, the state elites did seek to change the existing power relationships. However, even in these democratic states, levels of social inequality and economic poverty remained significant. In many other states, as the dependency theorists pointed out, the economy remained dependent upon the global capitalist market forces, and the state elites remained cut off from the needs and aspirations of their citizens. The current enthusiasm of many national elites for adjusting to the demands of global economic institutions shows how implicated the national states are in the whole process of marketisation and globalisation.
For feminists, the nation-state has always presented serious intellectual and strategic challenges. On the one hand, any engagement with the state has been questioned on the grounds that "the state...produces state subjects inter alia, bureaucratized, dependent, disciplined and gendered..." (Brown, 1992, p. 9 ; also see Alan in Watson). There has been an ongoing debate within the feminist movement about the expropriatory power of institutions (see Brown, 1992 , Rai, 1995 , Pringle and Watson, 1992 , Ehrenreich and Piven, 1982 . The various positions have covered the entire spectrum from rejecting 'dealing' with state institutions entirely, to suggesting a 'in and against' the state approach, to examining the benefits of working with/through state institutions. It has been argued elsewhere that for women the state and civil society are both complex terrains -fractured, oppressive, threatening and also providing spaces for struggles and negotiations. These struggles and negotiations are grounded in the positionings of various groups of women articulating their short and long term interests in the context of the multiplicity of power relations that form the state in any country. In turn, the state and its institutions are also 'shaped' by the forms and outcomes of these struggles. While denying any intentionality to the state, or a necessary coherence to the alliances formed and engaged in struggles against states, there are, however, particular characteristics of Third World states that need to be examined to form a judgement about the various possible spaces for mobilisation by women in their interests. In India, for example, state institutions and dominant political parties have taken up the cause of women's representation as part of the generalised discourse of modernity to which they subscribe. This discourse, while not unified in itself, allows sections of the state to take initiatives to respond to the struggles of women for equality as well as empowerment. This results in intra-state conflict which allows further possibilities of negotiations and struggles by and in the interests of women's interests. Further, the capacity of the state to implement its policies and enforce its laws is undermined by the weakness of the economy and of the political infrastructure, and widespread corruption which leads to the de-legitimisation of government and the political system. This lack of capacity further enhances intra-state conflict (Rai, 1995) .
However, state institutions cannot be the sole focus of these struggles. Civil society while providing a space for mobilisation also constrains the construction and organisation of interests that challenge the dominant discourses of gendered power. In this context, the relationship between the state and civil society becomes an important arena for negotiations and struggles. Where state institutions are deeply 'embedded' in civil society and its 'peak interest groups', state institutions are constrained not to propose policies that would be opposed by these peak interest groups. However, the modernist project that they ascribes to, especially when operating representative democratic politic systems, mean they cannot be entirely neglectful of issues arising for women's struggles, and forces them to take issue with some of the dominant interest groups. The result is a policy framework and its implementation that are at best patchy, allowing for another set of possibilities for struggles around expanding the domain of reform as well as improving the capacity of effectively implement existing policies (Rai, 1995a) . The nation state in its fractured and fractioned form thus remains an important focus for struggle for women. The national elites remain implicated in the changes to economic and social policies affecting women's lives, and the implementation of these policies brings women's groups into conflict and negotiations with state agencies. In tracing a path through the new spaces and old of work, welfare, and family resentments of national elites as well as pressures of global institutions become useful political tools.
The question of struggle has often raised the issue of the locale of struggle. Where are women most able to participate in struggles to improve their lives? Participation, a key concept in feminist politics, has been assumed to be most effective at the local level. So much so, that in some countries local participation has been sought to be institutionalised through legislation on the premise that development policy outcomes are sub-optimal when not supported by broad based participation from the social groups targetted by the policy (Robinson, 1998, forthcoming) . In Bolivia, for example, a Law of Popular Participation became effective in 1994, and in India, under the 73rd and 74th Amendments the village level governance instituitons (panchayats) were given greater powers and resources, and women were given a quota of 33 per cent on these re-invegorated instituions. In the debates on political participation of women, for example, the first agencies held up for scruitiny are at the village level. There has been an attempt to challenge the public/private divide in politics by presenting women's work supporting male members engaged in politics within the home as 'political' (Thapar,1993) . In the context of globalisation, the emphasis on NGO activity has also brought this political space into focus; the most effective NGOs work at the local levels.The nationstate seems at times to be replaced by the expansion of the local in political discourse. In the following section we examine this concept of the local -not as a missing link between the nation-state and global governance, but as a problematic terrain which women have to function on, and which affects the ways in which they are able to access the local economy and beyond. It is important to do this in order to see how the debates on post-development, and the changing/contracting role of the state are affecting the lives of men and women.
The Local as Refuge?
If women's work challenges the divisions between the public and the private, their lives also raise questions about the importance of the local spaces that they occupy. The 'local' has found privileged place in the vocabulary of different groups concerned with issues of development and democracy -basic needs theorists, environmentalists, sustainablity groups, feminists, and those intervening in the human rights debate. This has been for several reasons.
First, the emphasis on the local allowed a critique of nationalist agendas of political elites focused on big projects of industrialisation. As Pearson has commented, these projects assumed the man as worker, and in countries such as Brazil and India, we see industrialisation resulting in the falling levels of women's employment in the public sphere. Second, a focus on the local challenges the universalism of scientific discourses upon which the framework of modernisation was built by pointing to the salience of local knowledges and paradigms: "It is local knowledge that informs the birthing skills of the sages-femmes.....And it is local knowledge produced by workers that is the object of appropriation and control in both Taylorist and 'postindustrial' strategies of industrial management" (Kloppenburg, Jr., 1991, p.14; see also, Berry, 1991; Esteva and Prakash, 1997) . The idea of the local is sensitive to the context of peoples lives. "Related to the theme of context or locale is the idea of distance which also has social, emotional or geographical dimensions....between authors and subject...
[between] First Nation or Diaspora women" (Marchand and Parpart, 1995:77) .
Third, a focus on the local allows people to participate in the economic and political life of their communitiy "Thousands of small grassroots groups are realizing that there is no need to 'think big' in order to begin releasing themselves from the clutches of the monopolistic...economy; that they can free themselves in the same voluntary ways as they entered it" (Esteva and Prakash, 1997:280; ) Fourth, a focus on the local also challenges authoritarianism by promoting decentralisation and autonomy. The local, upon this view, is democratic, inclusive, and the site for feasible politics of resistance to both global and national nodes of power.
The recent emphasis on the 'grassroots' in the development funding agencies and their agendas is proof of the importance now being attached to the concept. NGOs as part of civil society organisation also find favour within this discourse. The argument there is that the local is not only closer to the lives of people, it is also allows for greater sensitivity to local ecology, it is more accountable, and more participatory (World Bank's report on Governance, 1994).
Finally, a focus on the local also challenges possessive individualism of the liberal rights discource by arguing that the universal language of rights cannot capture the complexities of historically rooted cultural practices that empower people at the local level in their communities: "In most Latin American, Asian or African villages, collective or communal rights have clear priority over personal or individual rights; legitimate hierarchies (of the elders, for example) have primacy over equality ...; and concrete customs, rather than abstract universalizable laws, support communal bonds and organize social support." (Esteva and Prakash, 1997:282 ; see also Sachs, 1997: 290) .
The focus on the local has been a powerful challenge to many of the fundamental reference points of development theory and practice. By advocating a decentralisation of power it has tried to make nation-states more accountable, people's and women's participation more feasible, the contexts of peoples' lives more visible, and the universalisms of science less monolithic. However, we need to sound a cautionary note here. This caution is dictated by various concerns. The first is that the privileging of the local space is very often linked to high. Marxist materialists have argued that urbanisation resulting from industrialisation will result in breaking down of the ascriptive roles in society, which affect women in particularly restrictive ways (Desai, ) . We would argue that urbanisation, while presenting their own problems and struggles, does afford women a relative freedom of action often denied them in the locales of their villages. We would suggest that the discource about empowerment through localisation could also be seen to be a Westernised discourse, where the local and urban have gone hand since the advent of Second Wave feminism. 2 When this discourse is transposed to the rural local of the majority of the Third World women, different cultural contexts make the valorisation of the concept more problematic. This is not to take away from the importance of the local in the lives of women, but to query the privileging of it as a freer, less distant, more empowering space. It is with such querying that we can put the politics in the local back in, rather than treating it as a homogeneous, cooperative and democratic space.
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The local is as fractured a space as the national or the global. It has its own power hierarchy in operation, with the resources to defend existing relations of power, and to suppress dissent. It is also therefore the space where democratic struggles need to be organised; it is not in itself a means of democratising life.
A growing literature on empowerment points to local spaces as arenas of participatory politics. However, within development discourse and practice, participation, as well as the local, have been depoliticised; participation as well as the 'decentralised space' has become the panacea for accountable development. As methodology, Robert Chambers' Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) technique is particularly popular with development agecies. The starting point of this methodology is also a dissatisfaction with the top-down approach of state-led development. "This approach is highly critical of Western experts, emphaisezes the need for less top-down approaches to development and assues the knowledge and analytical skills of the poor, no matter their education, can be brought ot light and strengthened through participatory methods which will lead to true empowerment and development." (Parpart, 1999, 260; Chambers, 1994b) Experiential innovation rather than theoretical abstractions are emphasised in this approach. Inclusiveness of the least privileged is one of its pillars. In a gendered critique of this methodology Parpart points to the deeply embeded patriarchal norms that the PRA practitioners cary with them, and emphasises that " [p] ower structures exist at the local level as well" (p. 264; see also Kabeer, 1995 and Tiessen, 1997) proponents of participation, and to involve NGOs in implementing projects that many governments increasingly cannot manage." (Nelson, 1996:624) .
I would argue that such a leaking out of politics from concepts serves only to maintain the status quo through instrumental confusion between ends and means. NGO activity has proliferated in recent years. It has been seen as indicative of the incapacity of nation-states on the one hand, and the privatisation of social welfare on the other (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994; Craske, 1998) . While the unaccountability of states is targetted that of the NGO sector is largely ignored. Kabeer has suggested that even when NGOs promote gender-senstivity within their programmes, the often fail to have much impact on local institutional structures (1995) . The work of the NGOs, while extremely important in immediate terms of structural adjustment, is also instrumental in depoliticisation of popular protest (Craske, 1998) . The bridging of the global-local divide by international NGOs brings forth its own issues. As Goetz has argued, state funded and managed local organisations are sometimes more sensitive to local customs and social relations and therefore better able to move gender agendas forward, than the INGOs who are seen as alien to the local milieu (1996) . The local thus presents as many challenges to women in negotiating their gender position as does the national and the global. Making use of each spatial and political level requires complex negotiations in furthering the advancement of women's position.
Global Governance and GAD: New challenges for Development?
The above discussion of levels of governance and issues raised by the shifting boundaries of the local, national and the international lead us to view the current debates on governance and how they imbricate with the agendas of engendered development. There are several important issues to be raised here. The first is that at the end of the twentieth century we find the fundamental issues of governance and development relatively unchanged -security and the enhancement of our life chances still preoccupy us most. Is this a failure of development strategies pursued, or an indicator of the limitations of our imaginations? Second, at the end of the twentieth century we find ourselves living in a world without ideological divide writ large in international politics. There is a sense of lack of alternative to the liberal ideology, which might be considered liberating for some and threatening for others. Third, we find ourselves living in a world that is clearly seen to be one, and yet where the individual competitive ethic is predominant. We can see this contradiction when we hear talk of sustainable development on the one hand, and sustainable growth on the other; interdependence and free market go hand in hand; technologist solutions predominate at the expense of redistributive ones. In this new/old context how are the feminist development agendas shaping up? What are the demands of the feminist movements regarding development? In this final section I briefly sketch out the dilemmas faced by feminist movements addressing issues of development in a global age.
Global Governance and a 'new design for development cooperation' .
Starting in 1990 the UN Development Programme has brought out annual Human Development Reports that reflect a new approach to measuring development in the light of debates on sustainable development, empowerment, and human capability in Development Studies (Chapter 2). Development has been regarded as enabling people to make, enlarge and have life choices. Considerable attention has been paid to disagregating development data for both men and women. What is absent in these reports, however, is a serious consideration of how these choices are to be enlarged for both men and women, given the structural constraints imposed but existing power relations in societies, and who is going to excercise them (Nijeholt, 1992, pp. 15-16) .
The 1994 In parallel, in the report of the Commission on Global Governance, we see this development discourse stretched to cover the governing institutions too (1995) . The Report speaks the language of 'global values', 'common rights', and addresses the role and potential of a transformative politics of civil society organisations and the non-governmental organisations.
(1995: 56-57). Its view of security is broader than the security of individual state borders, and encompasses people's human rights, and the need for demilitarization as part of the security agenda (pp71-74). It also point out that globalisation of the market is confined to the movement of "capital (but not labor) flows..." but does not seek to make changes to the WTO in the light of this observation. In his critique of the work of the Commission Baxi comments on the discrepancy between the assumptions of globality by the Commission and the "central facts of contemporary world disorder" (Alternatives, 21, 1996, pp525-549; p. 530) . Violence and poverty in particular are growing apace, and both affect women in particular ways. The feminisation of poverty, and violence against women in creating and policing new and old inter-state borders has made this co-operative development a fraught discourse for women. In this context Baxi rightly comments that "If governance is to be conceived as a process, it is well to recall that process is permeated by structures-in-dominance, both in states and civil socieites." (p. 532) The politics of co-operation as well as of confrontation and conflict needs to be made visible here; the wishing away of confrontation is the confimation of existing structures-in-dominance.
In terms of process of governance, the concept of global governance raises the issue of power too: "Effectiveness signals two kinds of power: first, to 'build upon and influence decisions taken locally, nationally and regionally'; second, to 'draw on the skills and resources of a diversity of people and institutions at many levels'" (p. 533). Who are the actors in global governance is an important a question as who are not included in the process of governance.
At the level of institutional actors, states, corporations, economic and social institutions, and civil society organisations and NGOs are all participants at different levels of governance. A glance at the gender balance of all these institutions would reveal a highly masculinised governance process and machineries. But gender is not the only axis of exclusion -class and race are the other.
Feminist co-optations? The politics of mainstreaming?
In the 1990s the system of global institutional politics has come under scruitiny. On the one hand, there is an attempt to provide the UN with an increased relevance -not as an organ of supra-national global governance, but as an organisation representing collective action of states in an 'issue specific' rather than generalised manner (Higgott, 1998:34) . On the other hand, the UN is generally considered to be ineffective, bureaucratised and unrepresentative of the rapidly changing world. The US has led the crusade for a refashioning of the UN machinery, and a great deal of emphasis has been given to making the UN more accountable to its members. The UN for its part, has had to deal with newly emerging powerful competing institutions of governace in the WTO, and has seen the earlier economic institutions -the World Bank and the IMF -making increasing inroads into the social and political arenas.
'Good governance' is on the agenda of the economic institutions and is being made part of the conditionality of aid. This has resulted in a demand by the donors upon the reciepient nations -"for democratic pluralism, for the rule of law, for a less regulated economy and for a clean and non-corrupt administration....for greater decentralization..." (UNDP, 1994:76) .
In this shifting pattern of governance debates and institutional initiatives, women have to address the issue at different levels. The first is that of agenda setting, the second, at the level of women's activism and its focus, and the third at the level of institutional participation and mainstreaming of gender politics and programmes of development. We would argue that a disaggregation of these levels reveals a complex picture. Globalisation and structural adjustment have also increased the engagement of women's civil society associations with not only the national state, but with international organisations -the UN, but also the World Bank. Some feminists have advocated such a "constructive engagement and 'entry' into institutional processes and cognitive frameworks, rather than employing more overtly political tactics of capturing the resources and undermining the public image of such institutions..." ((Scholte, Goetz et.al., forthcoming 1998,pp.27-28) . This could, of course, also mean providing legitimacy to the very organisations which are imposing conditionalities of various kinds -including withdrawal of state welfare -on nation-states. It again raises the issue of difference and how it plays out on the global feminist arena. At the level of agenda setting, the current activism of women's CSOs, particularly in the North, is thus focused on mainstreaming gender within international institutions. It also means a particular engagement with these economic institutions which could lead to a charge of cooptive politics (Nelson, 1996) ; that together with other issue based social movements, women's movements are also focused simply on gainig access to already established structures of power, rather than on challenging and if possible overthrowing these (Burnham, 1997) .
While not agreeing with such a blanket rejection of the non-class based politics, we would argue that in order to address the issue not simply of recognition of gender inequality but also of redistribution of resources to overcome this inequlity, women's activism has to invoke the politics of structural change as well as that of mainstreaming gender (Fraser, 1997; Young, 1997; Coole, 1997; Hoskyns and Rai, 1998) .
Conclusion
In laying out the various levels of governance that women have to negotiage with and struggle against, I have also sought to raise issues that these negoitiations and struggles pose for them.
Feminist movements as social movements have achieved a great deal in not only politicising gender within the nation-state but also within the international system. That has been the success of the women's and feminist movements. At the cusp of the new millenium, it is important to view this achievement with justifiable pride. When the World Bank begins to view gender as an important issue, when 'Women's Eyes on the Bank' make it uncomfortable and wanting to engage in the gender debate, feminist movements can take heart and keep up the pressure. When gender inequality becomes one important issue for assessing human development then women's social movements can be seen to have succeeded. However, the above discussion also shows the importance of the context of international power relations, of structural constraints that function within the local, national and international spaces to stymie not only the expansion of opportunities for women but sometimes their very survival.
In discussing the character and role of social movements Scholte et.al. make several points:
that these are a subset of civil society; they seek far-reaching transformation of society; their power lies in popular mobilisation to influence the holders of economic and political power.
They differ from state elites in that they do not have at their disposal means of coercion (legitimate or not); they differ from business interests as they do not command sufficient capital to influence public policy through its movement; they can be distinguished from interest groups in seeking large-scale social change -they are anti-systemic (p.9;). As such social movements are also democratic (p.10). There is however, a more cautionary view that points to the integrative function that social movements perform; they can be safety valves of discontented popular movements (Scott, 1990, p.15) . The middle class nature of women's movements' leaderships for example led many women activists in the Third World to keep distant from them. Feminism and feminists were labled as western and educated middle class women; an easy discourse for the local and state elites to use, but of no less concern to women who wanted to be seen to belong to the culture they were challenging. Secondly, when we examine the rhetoric of many social movements the critiques of the existing power relations are not always matched by a view of power that would allow them to move towards fundamentally redistributing resources. Increasingly, feminists are concerned that in succeeding in the battle for recognition of gender inequalities, feminist social movement is losing the struggle for redistribution of power relations (Fraser, 1997; Hoskyns and Rai, 1998) . It has also been argued that the idea of global civil society of which social movements are part is a "liberal recasting of world politics in a period of globalisation. 
